Castine throughout the ages has possessed a number of fortifications, both by the French, British, and Americans. Fort Pentagoet's history is well-known thanks to a major archaeological excavation in the early 1980's and Fort George's place in history is secure due to its prominence in the defeat of an American expedition in 1779. Tonight I am not going to speak about these larger and well-known fortifications, but about the small and rather obscure fortification known as Fort Madison. Do not be mislead by the smallness and seeming obscurity of this fortification, however; it is a crucial link in understanding how Massachusetts resisted the federal government's war efforts during the War of 1812.

The story of Fort Madison is highly complex. It is intimately related to the bitter partisan politics of the early republic. Two parties dominated American politics in this period. After 1801, the Republican Party, headed by President Thomas Jefferson, controlled the federal government. Republicans were strongly interested in the common man, especially the farmer. The Federalist Party opposed the Republicans, and favored commercial interests especially seaboard merchants. The Federalists were strong in coastal states like Massachusetts-- and Maine until 1820 was a part of the Bay State. Castine, as a seaport and a shiretown, was a bastion of Federalism: it's merchants, lawyers, and judges strongly identified with the Federalist elite in Boston. During the War of 1812, Maine Federalists stubbornly opposed the war effort, engaging in activities that at the very least bordered on treason. Fort Madison's history is an illustration of the problems the Republican government faced in waging an unpopular war.

The federal government built Fort Madison in the aftermath of the Chesapeake crisis. After the British ship Leopard attacked and overwhelmed the American frigate Chesapeake while attempting to recover some deserters, war appeared imminent between the United States and Great Britain. Both sides girded themselves for a war neither wanted. Out of this confusion a rumor began to circulate in Nova Scotia that a large American fleet was gathering in Penobscot Bay in preparation for a surprise attack on Halifax, a major Royal Navy base. The British forces in Halifax were hardly sufficient to repel a determined attack; the threat of American surprise attack was taken seriously enough to dispatch a spy to Castine. The spy was Lt. William Girod of the 101^st Regiment (Duke of York's Irish), who assumed the character of a Swiss, and sailed for Penobscot Bay.

Girod was probably relieved to find "not the smallest appearance of any hostile preparations" at Castine. Instead of an American invasion fleet, he found a few wood schooners. An unknown local informed the spy that the area possessed on a militia company, which occasionally trained in the use of cannon. Other than the crumbling remains of Fort George, the community presented a completely non-military appearance.

By the time Girod made his report, the American government was already moving to build a fort at Castine. In April, 1808, Major Moses Porter was sent to Maine to select sites to be fortified, among them one in Castine (explaining why the battery is sometimes called Fort Porter). The Castine site was not bought until April 1, 1809. The delay may have been caused by the high price asked for the land the government sought. Joseph Perkins sold the United States three acres near the harbor entrance for $450.00, rather a dear price when compared to similar sites.

With the lot purchased, construction soon proceeded. In September, most of the work was completed, but cannon had not yet been delivered. By the end of the year, the Secretary of War reported the existence of "a small enclosed work of four guns, mounted," with an anticipated garrison of 52 artillerists. The summer, 1980 Wilson Museum Bulletin has described in detail the appearance of Fort Madison, which consisted of a blockhouse, brick barracks, and an earth and masonry batter, over which four twenty-four pounder cannon protruded, mounted on common truck battery carriages.

Work was able to proceed so fast because Major Porter had an able assistant. Henry Dearborn appointed Josiah Hook of Castine as an agent to purchase all materials and hire the labor needed by Major Porter. Josiah Hook was a faithful adherent of the Jeffersonian cause, but he was not popular locally. His draconian measures in pursuing smugglers had raised the ire of many in Hancock County. By October, 1809, Hook was buying the finishing touches for the fort at William Witherle's store. Accounts from Witherle's store indicate that one Michael Carrill may have been in charge of the actual construction; he certainly charged a number of items on the fort's account, including significant quantities of those indispensable construction materials, gin and rum. The battery's association with Hook gave it an additional odium among Federalists. Pundits noted that these forts were strong enough only to prevent American ships from leaving port, and offered little protection against the might of the Royal Navy. Thus many harbor defenses such as Fort Madison were derided as "embargo forts." Notably, local newspapers of the day, such as Castine's own Eagle make on mention of Fort Madison at all. Apparently completed but unoccupied, it sat vacant until the summer of 1812.

The U.S. Army was too small to occupy the battery, either in peacetime or war. Initially the federal government wanted the fort to be manned by local militia drafted into federal service. There were several problems with that idea. First, the local militia was dominated by Federalists who bitterly resented any control of state militias by the national government. Growing intrusion into militia affairs caused many militia officers to resign in 1810. It seems likely that Joseph Lee of Castine, an ardent Federalist and militia colonel, was among them. Even when Maine was invaded in 1814, militia and U.S. Army officers bickered and squabbled over jurisdiction, and militia manned federal forts only reluctantly.

Second, official Massachusetts's militia doctrine called for a mobile force composed of hardly freemen. Already in the aftermath of the American Revolution, a "militia myth" had developed that propounded the military ability of the militia. Massachusetts was more vainglorious in this regard than most, one militia general crowing.

The third problem was that Massachusetts Governor Caleb Strong controlled the militia, and he was a bitter opponent of the war. Strong ignored the first three requests from the national government to call out the militia. The governor justified his actions by claiming no danger of invasion existed. Furthermore, many in Maine and Massachusetts supported his actions. Wars not only disrupted the economy, but many felt that they actually represented a threat to the morals and virtue of the republic. Standing armies were regarded with suspicion at best, and as an instrument of oppression at worst. In New England, where the army helped enforce unpopular commercial laws, Federalists predicted a "reign of Terror and the Bayonet."

The combination of these three problems made defending New England extremely difficult. In Fort Madison's case, the problem was compounded by the actual location of the battery. The fort was only a "water battery" designed to combat incoming warships: its defenses on the landward side consisted only of a wooden palisade. Any garrison in the fort had relied on another force to defend its rear, such as the militia. One military man commented, "under existing circumstances, the battery so far from protecting the harbor & village itself actually needed protection."

When war actually came, Governor Strong used every effort to hinder the federal government's war program. Strong ignored the June 22 request for Massachusetts militia to man coastal forts, including the three companies slated for Castine's battery. In addition, he replaced Hancock County's Republican militia general, George Ulmer of Lincolnville, with an officer less enthusiastic about the war. The national government countered by making Ulmer the colonel of a regiment of U.S. Volunteers. Ulmer personally recruited this unit in Hancock and Washington Counties, making sure that its officers were almost all Republicans. That proved offensive to area Federalists, as did the unit's mission to stop the huge smuggling trade. The pettiness did not stop there; Ulmer reported that Federalist militia officers actively discouraged men from enlisting in his unit. Castine went even further than that. In a town meeting, Castine publicly discouraged its citizens from enlisting in the U.S. Army.

The first unit to occupy For Madison was a "detached" company of Massachusetts militia, about whom very little I known. "Detached" militia were companies of Massachusetts militia called out at the request of the President of the United States to temporarily defend Maine's long exposed coastline. Governor Strong's response to President's call for militia assistance was dilatory; only on August 5, 1812, did he order out the detached militia, several months after the June 18 declaration of war. Even then, only three companies were called out, all from Hancock County-- and those marched not to the nearby coast, but to Eastport, over one hundred miles away.

The governor's response thus was not only late, but feeble as well. Fort Madison received only a handful of militia. In September, 1812, the garrison consisted of eight men and an officer, Ensign Preble. Not only was this number insufficient to defend the post, but it was not even enough to guard the prisoners of war brought in by privateers. Within a month of their capture, four out of six prisoners held at Fort Madison had escaped. Charles Tebbets, the local U.S. deputy marshal, had to refuse prisoners brought in fear of their escape. In August, 1813, there remained six prisoners at Fort Madison, several of whom had been there over a year. In October of that year they may have been joined by fifteen more.

The presence of prisoners of war at Fort Madison indicated the lack of cooperation Hancock County officials gave the federal government during the War of 1812. In other Maine towns, the local deputy U.S. marshal often interred prisoners of war in county jails at federal expense. In Castine, U.S. Deputy Marshal Tebbets only reported prisoners of war at the battery; likewise, POWs never appear in the Hancock County "Register of Prisoners." When Hancock County officials barred prisoners of war from the county jail in 1812, they anticipated a state-wide ban in 1814 by more than eighteen months. The reason why Hancock County barred prisoners of war from the Castine jail was probably based on a combination of political prejudice and pragmatism. Not only was war unpopular, but the jail small and crowded, with a history of problems with federal prisoners.

By early January 1813 the detached militia were replaced. Fort Madison became a temporary depot for companies belonging to Ulmer's Regiment of U.S. Volunteers. Several companies stopped at Fort Madison on their way to Eastport and Michias. They found a chilly reception in Castine. Not only was the war unpopular, but these troops were heavily involved in suppressing the smuggling trade in which Castine merchants had been active for some time. Area traders responded by either refusing to sell provisions to the troops, or by selling them an extortionate price.

The fort was permanently manned by Ulmer's volunteers on January 8, 1813, by a company under the command of Captain Joseph Westcott of Penobscot. Notably, the militia officer in charge of the fort initially balked at handing over command to Westcott. It was the first of a long series of problems for Westcott, whose fortunes were already at an ebb. Westcott was master of James Crawford's ship Thueydides of Castine when she wrecked in Ireland in January 1811. Perhaps he joined the army in an attempt to revive his sagging fortunes: if so, he was sadly mistaken, for his military career proved even more disastrous than his maritime one.

To be fair to Capt. Westcott, his company was untrained, had severe supply problems, and faced the hostility of those who opposed the war. No uniforms were provided his men with arms. Upon his arrival at the fort, Westcott found it possessed no bunks, straw for mattresses, or blankets for his men. Local merchants refused to extend credit to Westcott so he could feed his troops, and even Josiah Hook felt that he lacked the authority to supply them. In February Westcott undertook the arduous trip to Eastport to report to Ulmer and attempt to solve his supply problems. It was to no avail; the supply situation remained dismal through the first half of 1813. Meanwhile, Hancock County Federalists reaffirmed their opposition to the "ruinous war."

Worst of all, the troops remained unpaid from December 26 to March 1. Many of the soldiers were poor, and desperately needed pay to support their families. After consulting with his officers and men, Westcott set out for Portland with the appropriate paperwork to get his men's pay. He succeeded in getting his men's pay in cash, $1374.35, and instead of returning via the arduous land route, decided to embark on the sloop Harriet as far east as Herring Gut (Port Clyde). Westcott was probably quite pleased with himself as he stood on the foredeck of the vessel, with the payroll tucked into his left breast pocket. Perhaps he was daydreaming, for as the vessel tacked, the jibsheets crossed to deck and almost threw him into the ocean. While attempting to save himself, somehow the payroll fell out of his coat pocket. The bank notes floated for a tantalizing moment, but the strength of the wind prevented its recovery. Capt. Westcott must have returned to a very disappointed unit; only 24.35 remained out of the entire payroll.

Westcott sent a number of inquiries to a number of authorities, but to no avail. Finally on June 15, 1813, his company sent a petition to Congress describing the events and pleading for reimbursement. Four years later, in 1817, Congress finally addressed the issue. In an official report, Congress determined that "the loss was accidental, through the loose manner in which Captain Westcott was carrying the money was blamable." Westcott and his men remained unpaid.

Despite all the misfortune and misery they had endured at Fort Madison, at least some of Westcott's company re-enlisted. They joined on U.S. 34^th Regiment, but remained at Fort Madison. Westcott's garrison by July, 1813, was probably a mix of uniformed menders of the 34^th and nonuniformed members of Ulmer's Volunteers. There were some material benefits to reenlisting in the regular army, such as bonuses and furloughs. Furthermore, as a regular unit, the 34^th received its pay on a more regular basis, and received uniforms, equipment, and muskets. That is not to say the uniforms were wonderful; many were too small for the soldiers. Some uniforms coats were made of different colored cloth, so the soldiers looked like a "Chameleon, changing colors," or like "convicts." Uniform pants were described as "too short at both ends--narrow in the seat and hips." Blankets were "scarcely sufficient to cover a child in a cradle." Despite these small improvements, the garrison's troubles were not over yet.

Only a week after the garrison of Fort Madison sent its petition to Congress, and shortly after it received its uniforms, a new problem arose, involving a dispute between civil officials and federal military officers. The local populace had always bitterly resented the use of soldiers to pursue smugglers, and had developed a variety of means with which to peaceably stop the military from stopping the illegal trade with the enemy. One such means was to arrest and try soldiers who used force to apprehend smugglers. When Private John Campbell shot and mortally wounded a smuggler at Eastport in January 1813, Washington County Sheriff John Cooper arrested him. Cooper sent Campbell to Castine, to await trial in jail at the yearly Supreme Judicial Court. In the June trial, the jury found Campbell not guilty of murder, but did find him guilty of assault. The judge fined Campbell $40.00, made him post a bond for two year's good behavior, and required him to pay all the court costs.

The verdict did not sit well with the soldiers at Fort Madison. It was only too easy to see themselves in the unfortunate shoes of Campbell. The enlisted men of the garrison acted strongly. At midnight on June 23, thirty soldiers from the battery (over half the garrison) assaulted the jail. Using threats of violence, they forced the jailer to release Campbell, who escaped. The jailer, however, recognized several of the soldiers, (at least some of them wearing their new uniforms) and the next day informed Hancock County Sheriff Moses Adams, who rushed from Ellsworth to deal with the crisis.

County officials reacted by issuing warrants on several men from the garrison. Those whom the jailer had recognized, however, were no longer at the fort. Captain Westcott reported that he had given them furloughs the day before Campbell's escape. The Sheriff arrested a few men from the fort, but there was too little evidence to hold them. Within a few days officials apprehended three of those on furlough, and committed them to jail. Hancock County Judge William Crosby denied them bail. Captain Westcott and his men were reportedly very upset that the men were denied bail, and bore a grudge against the people of Castine. The townspeople feared another assault on the jail, or even on their persons and property. A night guard composed of town officials and assistants to the Hancock County Sheriff assemble to protect the jail and the community from the federal garrison.

Thoroughly alarmed, Hancock County Judges, called on local officials and Captain Westcott to hammer out a compromise. Westcott attempted to allay the judges' fears, but Sheriff Adams remained unconvinced. On his own authority, Adams called out twenty Castine militiamen to protect the town. He also requested a militia company from Ellsworth to assist in restoring order. After a forced march, Colonel Black and the Ellsworth Company of Light Infantry arrived. They remained in Castine, housed in the courthouse, for over a week. Some sort of agreement was made, and further commotion avoided. Westcott may have been relieved of command, or more likely, refused a commission in the regular army. It seems unlikely that Ulmer could offer him any assistance, as Ulmer himself was relieved of his command and arrested on a variety of charges only a few weeks later. Rancor remained in the community, however, the Castine town meeting in October of 1813 bitterly denounced the war.

Nor is much known about the winter of 1813-1814, except that Maine and Massachusetts became increasingly discontent with the war. In March 1814, the companies of the 34^th east of the Penobscot joined the rest of their regiment at Portland. Companies of the 40^th Regiment replaced them. Fort Madison fell under the command of a Captain Fillebrown.

Meanwhile, the British blockade was tightening, and local shipping sought refuge up the Penobscot and Bagaduce. Federalist William Abbott concluded that a defense of the town was "useless" if a substantial British fleet arrived. Castine's Committee of Safety doubled that stationing militia on Castine Neck would be of any use, but requested that the battery fire a gun as a signal for the militia to turn out. Penobscot's Committee of Safety and several other inhabitants of that town, including Joseph Westcott, implored the local militia commander to prepare himself for a British attack.

The occupation of Eastport on July 11 boded ill for all the territory east of the Penobscot. Many feared that Castine would be next. "What is to be done?" implored one merchant and politician to an American general. Once again, Governor Strong only belatedly and begrudgingly activated some militia, but only a few, and those to be supplied and paid by the federal government. Forth-six infantry and forty artillerymen were dispatched to help the garrison of Fort Madison defend Castine. In the fort itself there were perhaps nineteen regulars, commanded by Lt. Andrew Lewis. These numbers were clearly insufficient to defend the town. Rumors circulated that the Castine militia had declared it would not fight. When an American warship, USS Adams limped into Penobscot Bay after grounding on Isle au Haut, it's commander immediately perceived that Castine offered him no shelter, and proceeded up the Penobscot River, to Hampden. A British invasion fleet was hot on the Adams heels.

With the appearance of a British invasion fleet, the writing was clearly on the wall for Fort Madison. The local militia, sensible to the futility of fighting, refused to assist in the fort's defense and dispersed. The garrison seems to have prepared in advance to evacuate the post. Lt. Lewis fired a salvo at the enemy for the honor of the flag, and then withdrew with two field guns, which he hid in the woods in Bucksport. As he left, he spiked the four twenty-four pounders and lit a train that exploded the battery's magazine (which was probably in the blockhouse). His force retreated in good order, they retained their packs, further testimony to their preparedness for just such an eventuality. The British forces did recover some supplies from the fort, including a number of blue uniform coats with yellow cuffs.

The wily lieutenant fled to fight another day; he and his men later fought at Hampden in defense of the Adams. Another officer in Castine on recruiting duty, Captain John Fillebrown, also fled precipitously. He had more reason than most to resist capture; he had previously been captured at Eastport, and was on parole. While recruiting duties were admissible duty to a paroled officer, his second capture within six weeks might have proved awkward.

Fort Madison's career as a U.S. Army post literally ended with a bang as the magazine exploded. After the British evacuation in 1815, the fort moldered, decayed, and crumbled as locals stole building materials from it. Grandiose plans were composed by the Army after the war to re-fortify the peninsula, but budgetary and strategic concerns prevented it. By 1860, little was left other than some earthworks and the four twenty-four pounders, at least one of which remained on a carriage of sorts. It is almost as if Castine wanted to forget Fort Madison and the embarrassment and divisiveness it brought to the community. Even the federal government spurned tiny Fort Madison, preferring to quarter its troops in the more spacious confines of Fort George after the British had refurbished it. For the soldiers who served in it, Fort Madison may have proved a reminder of privations and misery. The final refusal of Congress to reimburse Westcott's company must have only reinforced this. Westcott himself died in 1830, fortunes seemingly unrepaired. Lewis continued his career in the military, achieved the rank of captain, and died in 1840 while in command of the post at Natchitoches, Louisiana.

Castine's residents had ample reason to try and forget the War of 1812. The hard financial times, political bickering, and the occupation of British and American armies were painful memories. Furthermore, Castine's association with Massachusetts Federalism, and its infamy as a center of trade with the enemy during the winter of 1814-1815 were politically and socially embarrassing. After the war, Castine turned its mind back to maritime trade and the issue of Maine's statehood. The community as a whole largely expunged Fort Madison from its memory, except for the little boys who ventured into it occasionally, seeking out the ghosts reported to haunt the old barracks.